You need an expert when assessing the standard of care and identifying what a reasonable person would do during the investigation of an accident or failure in the built environment. (Refs 1) For example, an engineer who has investigated the cause of problems like the following:

• Personal injury accidents
• Component and catastrophic failure of structures
• Ground subsidence
• Landslides
• Flooding
• Potholes or tire-worn tracks in roads
• Etc.

But what do you do when the problem requires an expert with two or more areas of expertise? For example, engineering design expertise and tradesman carpenter experience – like in house construction.

I thought this recently when repairing my balcony that is made of timber planks. And another time when underpinning a deck supported on a waste fill. In both cases I would need an engineer with tradesman experience to assess if what I did was reasonable – a slightly unusual combo of expertise.

Hmmmm…?

Repairing My Timber Deck

The tops of the outer ends of the inner two beams of four had rotted and no longer supported the deck planks properly. The beams had failed after 18 years. Why the inner beams and not the outer two? Also, why the tops of the outer ends of the beams and not the tops of the inner ends fastened to the house?

It was an easy call. It was a wetter environment at the tops of the outer ends of the beams beneath a lovely magnolia tree. The beams came to the end of their useful life for the environment they were in. All materials have a life in the built environment that engineers consider when designing.

Fixing the problem was an easy call too. Just replace the deteriorated beams with new ones. However, there is a difference in construction time and cost depending on how you do this.

The simplest, quickest, least expensive way involves installing new beams alongside the old ones. The old ones will rot away in time and the weight of the deck (dead load) and me and my family and friends walking around up there (live load) will slowly transfer to the new beams.

The more involved, slower, more expensive but possibly more conventional way involves temporarily underpinning the deck, removing the rotting beams and installing new ones.

Both repair methods will work but leaving the rotting beams in place is a tad unconventional. What would a reasonable person do, as required in a standard of care assessment? And where do I find such a person with lots of experience in both engineering and hands-on deck building?

I believe the bias in this situation would be to a person who has built a few decks but with some engineering experience.

Underpinning a Timber Deck

A friend’s deck had settled several inches over the years. The house and deck were built maybe 30 years ago. The wood deck and joists were supported on beams that in turn were supported by timber posts resting on concrete blocks. Typical residential deck construction.

Atypical was the concrete blocks resting on filled ground, not dense, natural ground typical of most of Nova Scotia. To make matters worse, the fill was a mixture of boulders, soil and tree stumps typical of waste material from a construction site. Fill, unlike natural ground settles over time; waste fill settles a lot.

But to give fill it’s due, the settlement decreases over time and becomes negligible in engineering terms. The time depends on a lot of factors including the type of fill and the natural ground below. I would expect a waste material like on my friend’s property to settle a lot and continue for a long time.

Measurements indicated the deck surface had settled about six (6″) inches midway between the corners at the rear. Examination of the bottom of the posts found a gap between the bottom and the top of the concrete blocks. The blocks had settled away from the bottom of posts as the waste fill settled. The gap was two (2″) at the midway post at the rear. Adding the size of the gap to the settlement of the deck indicated the surface of the waste fill had settled about eight (8″) inches in 30 years.

Fixing it was simple and easy, just install longer posts resting on the concrete blocks – a simple underpinning operation in engineering. But, what if the waste fill was still settling after 30 years and we come back a few months later and find gaps beneath the underpinning posts again?

Still an easy fix, install steel jack posts that can be adjusted in the future. The need for this adjustment would be apparent if the posts wobbled a little when examined later. Jack posts have a threaded section that can be screwed in or out like a big bolt – up or down in this situation – to remove any wobble.

But this requires periodic examination of the posts in the future. This could be avoided by excavating the waste fill at each post and supporting each concrete block on the natural ground below.

Another fix but a very expensive one, and a bit scary too because waste fills are unstable if you disturb them even after 30 years. Experienced engineers would leave the fill alone – let sleeping dogs lie – and experienced tradesmen certain to as well.

I believe the bias in this situation would be to a person with an engineering background who has built two or three decks.

***

Final thought on multi-expertise experts

The examples above are fairly simple but there are more complicated failures out there that require a team of expertise. What to do? For sure, be careful because there are those who claim more expertise than they’ve got.

The approach in engineering is to retain an engineer who would be the principal expert. S/he would identify the areas where additional expertise is needed and search for people in those areas and hire them. The principal engineer would then work with the sub-consultants/experts in determining cause. I did that when investigating the cause of a nail gun accident and also an old fuel oil spill.

References

1. How the standard of care is determined when a failure or accident occurs in the built environment. Posted June 28, 2014 (The posted blog has been updated to October 30, 2020 as noted in the blog) A good read with lots of references.

(Posted by Eric E. Jorden, M.Sc., P.Eng. Consulting Professional Engineer, Forensic Engineer, Geotechnology Ltd., Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada July 29, 2022 ejorden@eastlink.ca)   

The right thing requires experts to: (Refs 1, 2 and 3)

1. Be independent from the parties who retain them;
2. Provide objective, unbiased opinion evidence in relation only to matters within their expertise; and
3. Avoid assuming the role of advocates for the parties that retain them.

***

The nurturing doesn’t get any better in Canada than that fostered by The Ritual of the Calling of an Engineer, and the presence of the iron ring on the working hand of an engineer. (Ref. 4) I thought this on realizing it was 100 years ago that the idea of The Ritual first came to mind and that 2025 is the anniversary of the first ceremony.

In 1922, H. E. T. Haultain, a Montreal engineer proposed the creation of a ceremony emphasizing a standard of ethics for engineers. The idea developed in talks with others at the time. He asked Rudyard Kipling to draft The Ritual after reading Kipling’s poem Sappers about engineers. The iron ring is given the engineer on recital of the Obligation during The Ritual.

You see the iron ring and know a Canadian engineer is wearing it and that’s important. But that’s about all you know because The Ritual is private for engineers and witnessed only by their peers and seniors in the profession.

Following is an abstract of the Obligation the engineer accepts when he answers the Calling. You can google the text in full as accepted by Canadian engineers for the first time in 1925 and most recently this spring, 2022. The iron ring is inferred in the Obligation by reference to Cold Iron:

“During The Ritual the engineer is called to morally agree, to the best of his knowledge and power, not to pass or be privy to passing bad workmanship or faulty material.

Nor refuse his time, thought and care towards the stability and perfection of any works in which he is involved.

He’ll take wages to which he is entitled and guard his reputation. But he will not belittle his fellows.

He knows he will make mistakes and asks forgiveness of his peers and seniors beforehand. He trusts that in the face of temptation the memory of his Obligation agreed to during the The Ritual may return to him to aid.

On his honour and Cold Iron he will abide by these things.”

You get some idea of the import of the Iron Ring on realizing it means more to many engineers than the piece of paper on the wall – the engineering degree. And that it serves as a subtle reminder – continuous nurturing – of The Ritual in which the expert engineer took part and the Obligation accepted.

References

1. Stockwood, Q.C., David, Civil Litigation, A Practical Handbook, 5th ed., 2004, Thompson Carswell
2. Principles governing the cost cost control of dispute resolution and claim settlement involving experts. Posted July 30 2019
3. Civil procedure rule 55 in Nova Scotia
4. Google The Ritual of The Calling of An Engineer also the Iron Ring

(Posted by Eric E. Jorden, M.Sc., P.Eng. Consulting Professional Engineer, Forensic Engineer, Geotechnology Ltd., Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada July 14, 2022 ejorden@eastlink.ca)   

Why? Because I like to write, to compose something that didn’t exist before, like an essay – a blog. It feels good. Also because 10 years and 276 blogs is a respectable length of time and effort and it’s nice to keep it going.

I’ve learned that you like to read them too, if testimonials are any indication: A senior lawyer in Atlantic Canada said, “I love that stuff..!!”.  Another senior legal chap on the east coast commented, “…like reading them.”  And an insurance claim consultant said, “I read every one”.  It’s hard to beat comments like that.

I like to write at the interface between my field of study and others. I enjoy describing “…the nature and methods of forensic engineering and expert services” so you will understand.

It’s important that you understand because the dispute resolution process requires that you know something about the expert services that you retain and rely on. (Ref. 1) Same as I must know something about the process that I’m assisting as an expert. And, if I dare ‘fess up, I learn when I blog because I must research some topics, at least a little.

The title for this blog came to mind when I leafed through Ogilvy’s ancient text – 1963 -, “Confessions of an Advertising Man”. (Ref. 2) It’s all about stopping the reader in his tracks, getting him in off the sidewalk, and talking to him in plain English about a product – in this case, forensic work. A good read, still cited decades later regardless of what you write.

Then, as far as the actual blog is concerned I must never forget – like I do sometimes – to write in jargon-free English using short words, sentences and paragraphs. (Refs 3 and 4)

The fact that I like to write came to mind a few years ago. My daughters got after me to write a memoir about living and working around the world for seven years – in some interesting places and on some challenging engineering jobs.

One, the investigation and fixing of a railway embankment that failed in northern Australia, up near Thursday Island. I got to the site each day in a boat circled by crocodiles as we made our way across the estuary of a river.

Believe it or not some topics in forensic work are almost as exciting to write about as a crocodile that would like to eat you. I also want you to know about forensic work.

There are more reasons in the Appendix.

References

1. The Advocates Society, Toronto, Ontario, Principles governing communicating with testifying experts, June, 2014
2. Ogilvy, David, Confessions of an Advertising Man, MacMillan Publishing, New York, 1963, 1987
3. Zinsser, William, On Writing Well, The Classic Guide to Writing Non- Fiction 7th ed., Harper Collins, New York 2007
4. Mangraviti, James J., Babitsky, Steven and Donovan, Nadine Nasser, How to Write an Expert Witness Report, 2nd ed., 560 pages, SEAK, Inc., Falmouth, MA 2014

Appendix

1. Why am I feeling good about blogging these days? Posted February 26, 2021
2. Why do I blog? One reason: A blog is often like a mini expert report in story form. Posted August 15, 2019. Quite a good read.
3. Why do I blog? – See a few good, perhaps one or two surprising reasons in the following. Posted July 13, 2018
4. Why do I blog? Posted June 30, 2017
5. Why do I blog on forensic engineering investigation? Posted July 22, 2016
6. Why do I blog on forensic engineering? Posted August 7, 2014

(Posted by Eric E. Jorden, M.Sc., P.Eng. Consulting Professional Engineer, Forensic Engineer, Geotechnology Ltd., Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada June 30, 2022 ejorden@eastlink.ca)   

I’ve mentioned before that there are civil litigation and insurance claims waiting to happen in the built environment. We engineers see the potential often enough. (Ref. 1) Others do as well as evident by EPIC planning a webinar that will identify the signs and symptoms. Many of these occur during the project management stage. (Ref. 2)

EPIC (Educational Program Innovation Centre) is a company in Mississauga, Ontario that provides training and courses for engineers and technical professionals.

Many of their courses are well suited and easily understood by non-technical folk. For example, this one coming up on the warning signs of potential claims and disputes. It will be presented as a seminar on the web July 19 from 1:00 pm to 3:00 pm Atlantic.

I was quite enthused when I saw the content as described by EPIC. It recognizes the value to those who cause the problems and those who are hurt by them. EPIC describe the course this way:

After attending this webinar, you will:

• Learn about a large number of early warning signs of claims and disputes.
• Learn what types of claims and disputes can arise from each warning sign.
• Understand what must be done to prevent such follow on claims and avoid disputes.

Webinar description:

It is axiomatic that claims and disputes on a project do not simply appear out of nowhere. Experience indicates that when a dispute occurs, there is normally a back story or history of events, decisions, lack of decisions, etc. that can be traced back from a few weeks to several years that gave rise to the dispute. It is typically these past events or decisions that are identified as the “early warning signs” of claims and disputes.

Typically, it is only when claims are filed at the end of a project that attorneys and claims consultants review project documentation and interview the project team that these early warning signs are identified. And, in retrospect, many project team members comment “If only I had recognized that then!”

Research reveals there is little literature setting forth a detailed list of early warning signs of pending construction claims and disputes. Based on the collective observations of numerous construction claims consultants the Ankura Construction Forum collated these early warning signs into the typical phases of a project including:

• Bid or Proposal Phase
• Initial Contract Phase
• Construction Phase

This webinar also identifies which party should watch for which early warning sign and what sort of claim or dispute may arise. 

This is a comprehensive seminar and worth attending. If there’s a hiccup in what EPIC is planning, it may be the omission of the design phase in project management, as in:

• Design Phase
• Bid or Proposal Phase
• Initial Contract Phase
• Construction Phase

Based on what I’ve seen over the years in my forensic engineering practice there’s no question that claims and disputes can arise out of the design phase in project management. Possibly witness the bridge failure in Saskatchewan hours after it was opened to the public. (Ref. 3) Fingers are pointing at the design engineer but, rightly so, the jury is still out.

It does seem as though the engineer was involved in all phases of the project – Design, Bid, Contract and Construction. I’m certain that EPIC’s webinar will throw light on what happened in Saskatchewan, as well as the signs and symptoms of claims and disputes on all projects.

References

1. A reminder that failure and accidents are predictable even if the culprit is climate change. Posted May 11, 2022
2. How is a forensic investigation different from a project? Posted April 30, 2022
3. Did vested interests lead to bridge failure and trouble for the design engineer? Posted May 25, 2022

(Posted by Eric E. Jorden, M.Sc., P.Eng. Consulting Professional Engineer, Forensic Engineer, Geotechnology Ltd., Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, June 23, 2022. ejorden@eastlink.ca) 

I was annoyed at the back up in traffic on the approach to Fall River, Nova Scotia the last few days – at least till last Sunday when I was coming back to Halifax. It was kilometres long and took a good 3/4 hour to get past a highway construction site.

I was coming back to town after an engineering class reunion at the University of New Brunswick in Fredericton. The back up was there on my way out of town the previous Thursday – four days earlier.

This kind of back up was not necessary, and it was dangerous too. It was caused by the heavy, bumper to bumper traffic in the two inbound lanes reduced to one at the construction site. The two outbound lanes were light of traffic in the extreme.

I don’t know why one of the heavy traffic lanes wasn’t directed across a temporary gravel road across the medium to one of the light, outbound traffic lanes. It’s simple engineering and been done before in Nova Scotia. Also, why wasn’t some of the heavy traffic directed onto the old road into town at one of the exits up the road? It too has been done before.

Dangerous as well like I said. The 4×4 Yahoos had no trouble dropping down onto the gravel shoulder and tearing up to an exit well before they should. Increasing the dangerous situation even more. Then there was the gravel dust kicked up by the Yahoos that the rest of us had to breathe.

I’m sure this avoidable traffic jam was an element in any later accidents in the area in the days or weeks that the avoidable jam was there. Also the cause of coughing and difficult breathing for some drivers and passengers.

There are civil litigation and insurance claims waiting to happen in the built environment – just ask an engineer – and they were there for a time at Fall River.

(Posted by Eric E. Jorden, M.Sc., P.Eng. Consulting Professional Engineer, Forensic Engineer, Geotechnology Ltd., Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, June 10, 2022. ejorden@eastlink.ca)   

If most disputes are settled on the court house steps – I’ve seen 94% mentioned, one source said 98% – then the mistakes experts make during investigating and reporting are the ones that must be found out and corrected. This as compared to how tidy their CV looks, for example, or their demeanor and how well they answer questions during Discovery.

I would think the report is the hard evidence on the cause of the failure or accident, particularly if it’s been peer-reviewed. I repeat, if it’s been peer-reviewed. Wouldn’t this carry the day even if the expert messes up during Discovery?

The different categories of mistakes experts make and the numbers within each category have been identified, yet guidance for experts by different groups has emphasized report writing. There are lots of manuals out there including one big book that is 560 pages long, as well as guidance for experts by the judicial process on writing an opinion. It seems to me that says something wrt report writing.

I was prompted to comment on this when I saw the topic for the upcoming conference in St. Andrews, New Brunswick by the Atlantic Provinces Trial Lawyers Association (APTLA). It’s comprehensive and the speakers cover a lot on preparing an expert for Discovery – I wish I was free to attend – but it seems light on the expert’s Achilles heel – his report.

(Posted by Eric E. Jorden, M.Sc., P.Eng. Consulting Professional Engineer, Forensic Engineer, Geotechnology Ltd., Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, May 31, 2022. ejorden@eastlink.ca)   

I was sorry to learn about the Regina design engineer, Scott Gullacher, being implicated in a bridge failure in Saskatchewan in 2018. I wasn’t too surprised. CBC News reported on the failure at the time. Then again on May 13 about the engineer facing a disciplinary hearing by the Saskatchewan Professional Engineering Association.

The bridge carried a rural road over the Swan River at Clayton, 300 km east of Saskatoon. It was supported on a piled foundation – screw piles. These are good like driven piles in suitable foundation soils that are determined during a geotechnical investigation. Except in this case the piled foundation failed causing the bridge to collapse a few hours after opening. Pictures of the collapsed bridge are striking at:

https://apple.news/A7HQ38AtqQsWr2lMpAIFHkQ

Surveys have found “that most foundations failures are due to inadequate geotechnical investigation”. (See Appendix) This type of engineering investigation determines the physical properties of the ground used in designing suitable foundations for support of a structure – a bridge in this case. (Ref 1)

Based on what I’ve read, it’s another example of the pushing and pulling among the vested interests with their respective bottom lines – both government and private. The tug of war this time over a geotechnical investigation of the foundation soil conditions – should we or shouldn’t we, spend the money?

Too often in situations like this the design engineer is caught in the middle of the quandary and seen as the arbitrator in the war. S/he knows an adequate investigation should be carried out.

What’s adequate? Only the geotechnical engineer knows for sure. Was a geotechnical engineer consulted in this case? Hopefully the disciplinary hearing will report on this – if they do their job properly.

References

1. What is geotechnical engineering? Posted December 21, 2021

Appendix

Long ago I learned “that most foundation failures are due to inadequate geotechnical investigation”.  This was based on a study in England.  The source was reliable enough that I referenced it in a chapter for a publication planned by the Canadian Geotechnical Society at the time. 

The surficial geology in England is more variable than here; you can’t take a couple steps across a construction site over there without the soil conditions changing.  Still, you’ve got to be careful in Canada too as the bridge failure attests. 

(Google earth pictures of the river and bridge site might raise alarms about possible poor foundation soil conditions to anyone with a basic knowledge of terrain analysis. For example, I would suspect weak foundation soils on the bed of a meandering river)

There’s no glamour in the ground Karl Terzaghi said – the father of soil mechanics.    

I’ve also got the idea over the years that construction engineers are happy campers when they get construction out of the ground – dirt doctors don’t mind being down there.  Also that below ground construction is a disproportionately higher part of the project cost. 

I’m not surprised the design engineer ran into trouble and strife on the Saskatchewan bridge failure, regardless of who is reported as responsible at the end of the day. He was there in the thick of it.

(Posted by Eric E. Jorden, M.Sc., P.Eng. Consulting Professional Engineer, Forensic Engineer, Geotechnology Ltd., Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, May 25, 2022. ejorden@eastlink.ca)   

I was reminded by the report in The Washington Post on Monday of the catastrophic bridge collapse in Hassanabad, Pakistan that failures large and small are predictable. (Ref. 1) And most are preventable. For sure, probably not this one but knowing it could happen goes a long way to preventing loss of life.

The cause this time was a lake flooding at the toe of a glacier and spilling out to charge the river beneath the bridge. The flooding, as easily explained by glaciologists, was due to record heat and a melting glacier – climate change. The bridge had no problems with flood waters for decades; it was the magnitude this time.

I can imagine the glaciologists raised the alarm but who listens to such esoteric scientists? For that matter, to engineers and applied scientists, in general, about problems in the built environment?

I thought about the Saint John river flood a few years ago when I read about the bridge collapse in the Post. This flood, due to snow melt raising the level of the Mactaquac Dam reservoir, was predictable and not so unlike what happened in Pakistan. The flooding was often prevented in the past by the periodic release of water from the Dam to keep the reservoir level down. But there is a trade-off between keeping the water level down to prevent flooding and up to generate electricity.

So so so many problems in the built and natural environments are predictable based on simple engineering and physic’s principles – simple physics like in high school. Problems like bridge failures, ground subsidence in Karst terrain, construction crane collapses, foundation failures, floods, slip and falls, etc. You name it, what can wrong can often be predicted.

But sadly not prevented in the short term as climate change wreaks it’s wrath waiting for the world to catch on.

References

1. Patel, Kasha, The Washington Post, Monday, May 9, 2022

(Posted by Eric E. Jorden, M.Sc., P.Eng. Consulting Professional Engineer, Forensic Engineer, Geotechnology Ltd., Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, May 11, 2022. ejorden@eastlink.ca)   

The main difference? You know where you’re going when you work on a project whereas the end result of a forensic investigation is a mystery. Particularly if you follow-the-evidence.

A project is all the work you do one time. Whether it’s designing a bridge, building a garden, or creating a web page, every project produces an outcome and every project has a beginning and an end. (Ref. 1)

It’s a one-time job that has a definite starting point, end point, a clearly defined scope of work, a budget, and is multi-task in nature. (Ref. 2)

The Project Management Institute puts it still another way, “A temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique product or service”. (Ref. 3)

For example, engineers apply science and mathematics in the use of materials to design and construct a project useful to people. Materials like steel, concrete, wood, plastic, water, soil and rock for a bridge.

When something goes wrong during the project or afterwards engineers carry out a forensic investigation to determine the cause. This would include personal injury accidents. (Ref. 4)

Projects and forensic investigations both involve carrying out a number of tasks. However, where the tasks forming a project are well known at the start, those for a for a forensic investigation are only approximately known.

These tasks are identified accurately in a “Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)” for a project. A WBS is a simple list of tasks. A similar list can be prepared for a forensic investigation but is approximate particularly for a difficult investigation.

Similar issues exist when estimating costs. They are (very) approximately known at the start of a project, (a little) better known in the middle and (accurately) accurately known at the end. Factor in the parenthetic expressions for a forensic investigation.

I thought to comment on these similarities and differences when I realized a WBS would be useful in forensic investigation. Then it struck me I must be careful comparing a project to a forensic investigation lest the latter take on a commercial ring. There’s nothing commercial about determining the cause of a failure or accident to facilitate dispute resolution even when it involves a commercial building.

References

1. Verzuh, Eric, The Fast Forward MBA in Project Management, Wiley and Sons 1999
2. Lewis, James P., Project Planning, Scheduling & Control, 3rd edition McGraw Hill 2001
3. Meredith, Jack R. and Mantel, Jr., Samuel J., Project Management, a Managerial Approach 4th edition Wiley and Sons 2000
4. What is forensic engineering? Posted September 28, 2021 and November 20, 2012

(Posted by Eric E. Jorden, M.Sc., P.Eng. Consulting Professional Engineer, Forensic Engineer, Geotechnology Ltd., Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, April 30, 2022. ejorden@eastlink.ca)   

I see that Discovery is the theme for the Atlantic Provinces Trial Lawyers Association (APTLA) conference this June 10th and 11th in St. Andrews, NB. Specifically, The Art and Science of Discovery Examinations.

I don’t see much in the conference on mistakes expert witnesses make and how to avoid them. Yet there are a lot of them and I’m certain this will get attention at the conference. To be fair, nor have I seen a detailed outline of what the speakers plan to cover.

One source I studied identifies 220 mistakes based on research of the literature. A further 158 were suggested by trial lawyers, jury consultants and well known experts who were canvassed – 378 mistakes in total! On reading this material, I know I could add a few based on what I’ve seen over the years. I’m certain my colleagues in forensic work could as well. How about an expert taking a file on contingency?

A review of guidelines on expert report writing is certain to highlight more mistakes. There’s a lot of dos and don’ts. I didn’t want to get into overkill with more detailed research; a total of 378 mistakes is enough.

I see in the literature that the 220 mistakes can be partly categorized as follows with a few example mistakes taken from the many. Some mistakes are common, others are quite surprising to me and I’m sure to others:

1. The Expert CV 2 example mistakes out of a total of 23 a) Mistake: Inaccuracies on a CV like misleading information b) Mistake: Listing past cases with results on your CV
2. Web Pages 2 example mistakes out of 19 a) Mistake: Having inconsistent Web CV and paper CV b) Mistake: Listing innumerable areas of expertise
3. Researching, Investigating, Forming and Expressing Opinions 3 mistakes out of 24 a) Mistake: Accepting rush cases that do not permit you to follow your standard protocol b) Mistake: Failing to document your work c) Mistake: Not corroborating facts provided by counsel
4. Report Writing 4 mistakes of 32 a) Mistake: Letting counsel help write your report by sharing a draft with him/her b) Mistake: Basing the report on insufficient data c) Mistake: Using vague terms in the report d) Mistake: Allowing your word processing software to track the changes that you make to your report
5. Depositions 3 mistakes of 31 a) Mistake: Taking notes at the deposition b) Mistake: Answering questions regarding a document you do not have in front of you c) Mistake: Being afraid to say “I don’t know”
6. Direct Testimony 2 example mistakes out of 18 a) Mistake: Using terms that the judge and jurors do not understand b) Mistake: Getting outside your true area of expertise
7. Cross Examination 2 example mistakes out of a total of 23 a) Mistake: Not advocating for your opinion b) Mistake: Giving new opinions on cross examination without careful reflection

There are more categories in the literature about the 220 mistakes but this is enough to illustrate the problem.

The 158 mistakes were presented differently, but with a little effort I’m sure they could be categorized in a similar way.

I believe APTLA are doing Yeoman service for their members in “…taking a deep dive into Discoveries” during the conference. I believe that the first promise during the dive to “…show you how to prepare your client” for Discovery would benefit from knowing about the 378 mistakes experts make.

I’ve dedicated my blog over the past 10 years to enlightening civil litigation lawyers, insurance claims managers and property owner to the nature and methods of forensic work. Drawing attention to the mistakes experts make is in tune with that resolve.

Postscript

I thought on completing this blog that it would be helpful to study the 378 mistakes and identify those I’ve seen in Canada. Perhaps get my colleagues Down East to chip in what they’ve seen. The sources I checked are to U.S. publications and while helpful do not necessarily reflect completely on the situation in Canada.

(Posted by Eric E. Jorden, M.Sc., P.Eng. Consulting Professional Engineer, Forensic Engineer, Geotechnology Ltd., Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, April 25, 2022. ejorden@eastlink.ca)